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ABSTRACT 
 
When the human element is introduced into decision support system design, entirely new 
layers of social and ethical issues emerge but are not always recognized as such.  This 
paper discusses those ethical and social impact issues specific to decision support systems 
and highlights areas that interface designers should consider during design with an 
emphasis on military applications.  Because of the inherent complexity of socio-technical 
systems, decision support systems are particularly vulnerable to certain potential ethical 
pitfalls that encompass automation and accountability issues.  If computer systems 
diminish a user’s sense of moral agency and responsibility, an erosion of accountability 
could result.  In addition, these problems are exacerbated when an interface is perceived 
as a legitimate authority. I argue that when developing human computer interfaces for 
decision support systems that have the ability to harm people, the possibility exists that a 
moral buffer, a form of psychological distancing, is created which allows people to 
ethically distance themselves from their actions.     
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Understanding the impact of ethical and social dimensions in design is a topic that 
is receiving increasing attention both in academia and in practice.  Designers of decision 
support systems (DSS’s) embedded in computer interfaces have a number of additional 
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ethical responsibilities beyond those of designers who only interact with the mechanical 
or physical world.  When the human element is introduced into decision and control 
processes, entirely new layers of social and ethical issues (to include moral 
responsibility) emerge but are not always recognized as such.  Ethical and social impact 
issues can arise during all phases of design, and identifying and addressing these issues as 
early as possible can help the designer to both analyze the domain more comprehensively 
as well as suggest specific design guidance.  This paper discusses those accountability 
issues specific to DSS’s that result from introducing automation and highlight areas that 
interface designers should take into consideration. 
If a DSS is faulty or fails to take into account a critical social impact factor, the 
results will not only be expensive in terms of later redesigns and lost productivity, but 
possibly also the loss of life.  Unfortunately, history is replete with examples of how 
failures to adequately understand decision support problems inherent in complex 
sociotechnical domains can lead to catastrophe.  For example, in 1988, the USS 
Vincennes, a U.S. Navy warship accidentally shot down a commercial passenger Iranian 
airliner due to a poorly designed weapons control computer interface, killing all aboard.   
The accident investigation revealed nothing was wrong with the system software or 
hardware, but that the accident was caused by inadequate and overly complex display of 
information to the controllers (van den Hoven, 1994).  Specifically, one of the primary 
factors leading to the decision to shoot down the airliner was the perception by the 
controllers that the airliner was descending towards the ship, when in fact it was climbing 
away from the ship.   The display tracking the airliner was poorly designed and did not 
include the rate of target altitude change, which required controllers to “compare data 
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taken at different times and make the calculation in their heads, on scratch pads, or on a 
calculator - and all this during combat (Lerner, 1989).”   
This lack of understanding the need for a human-centered interface design was 
again repeated by the military in the 2004 war with Iraq when the U.S. Army’s Patriot 
missile system engaged in fratricide, shooting down a British Tornado and an American 
F/A-18, killing three pilots. The displays were confusing and often incorrect, and 
operators, who only were given ten seconds to veto a computer solution, were admittedly 
lacking training in a highly complex management-by-exception system (32nd Army Air 
and Missile Defense Command, 2003). In both the USS Vincennes and Patriot missile 
cases, interface designers could say that usability was the core problem, but the problem 
is much deeper and more complex.  While the manifestation of poor design decisions led 
to severe usability issues in these cases, there are underlying issues concerning 
responsibility, accountability, and social impact that deserve further analysis. 
Beyond simply examining usability issues, there are many facets of decision 
support system design that have significant social and ethical implications, although often 
these can be subtle.  The interaction between cognitive limitations, system capabilities, 
and ethical and social impact cannot be easily quantified using formulas and 
mathematical models.  Often what may seem to be a straightforward design decision can 
carry with it ethical implications that may go unnoticed.   One such design consideration 
is the degree of automation used in a decision support system.  While the introduction of 
automation may seemingly be a technical issue, it is indeed one that has tremendous 
social and ethical implications that may not be fully understood in the design process.  It 
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is critical that interface designers realize the inclusion of degrees of automation is not 
merely a technical issue, but one that also contains social and ethical implications.  
 
2. AUTOMATION IN DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
 
In general, automation does not replace the need for humans; rather it changes the 
nature of the work of humans (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).  One of the primary design 
dilemmas engineers and designers face is determining what level of automation should be 
introduced into a system that requires human intervention.   For rigid tasks that require no 
flexibility in decision-making and with a low probability of system failure, full 
automation often provides the best solution (Endsley & Kaber, 1999).  However, in 
systems like those that deal with decision-making in dynamic environments with many 
external and changing constraints, higher levels of automation are not advisable because 
of the risks and the inability of an automated decision aid to be perfectly reliable (Sarter 
& Schroeder, 2001).   
Various levels of automation can be introduced in decision support systems, from 
fully automated where the operator is completely left out of the decision process to 
minimal levels of automation where the automation only presents the relevant data.  The 
application of automation for decision support systems is effective when decisions can be 
accurately and quickly reached based on a correct and comprehensive algorithm that 
considers all known constraints.  However, the inability of automation models to account 
for all potential conditions or relevant factors results in brittle-decision algorithms, which 
possibly make erroneous or misleading suggestions (Guerlain et al., 1996; Smith, 
McCoy, & C. Layton, 1997).  The unpredictability of future situations and unanticipated 
responses from both systems and human operators, what Parasuraman et al. (2000) term 
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the “noisiness” of the world makes it impossible for any automation algorithm to always 
provide the correct response.  In addition, as in the USS Vincennes and Patriot missile 
examples, automated solutions and recommendations can be confusing or misleading, 
causing operators to make sub-optimal decisions, which in the case of a weapons control 
interface, can be lethal.   
In addition to problems with automation brittleness, significant research has 
shown that there are many drawbacks to higher levels of automation that relegate the 
operator to a primarily monitoring role.  Parasuraman (2000) contends that over-
automation causes skill degradation, reduced situational awareness, unbalanced 
workload, and an over-reliance on automation.  There have been many incidents in other 
domains, such as nuclear power plants and medical device applications, where confusing 
automation representations have led to lethal consequences.  For example, in perhaps one 
of the most well-known engineering accidents in the United States, the 1979 cooling 
malfunction of one of the Three Mile Island nuclear reactors, problems with information 
representation in the control room and human cognitive limitations were primary 
contributors to the accident.  Automation of system components and subsequent 
representation on the instrument panels were overly complex and overwhelmed the 
controllers with information that was difficult to synthesize, misleading, and confusing 
(NRC, 2004) 
The medical domain is replete with examples of problematic interfaces and 
ethical dilemmas.  For example, in the Therac-25 cases that occurred between 1985-1987, 
it was discovered too late for several patients that the human-computer interface for the 
Therac-25, which was designed for cancer radiation therapy, was poorly designed.  It was 
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possible for a technician to enter erroneous data, correct it on the display so that the data 
appeared accurate, and then begin radiation treatments unknowingly with lethal levels of 
radiation.  Other than an ambiguous “Malfunction 54” error code, there was no indication 
that the machine was delivering fatal doses of radiation (Leveson & Turner, 1995).   
Many researchers assert that keeping the operator engaged in decisions supported 
by automation, otherwise known as the human-centered approach to the application of 
automation, will help to prevent confusion and erroneous decisions which could cause 
potentially fatal problems (Billings, 1997; Parasuraman, Masalonis, & Hancock, 2000; 
Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).  Reducing automation levels can cause higher workloads 
for operators; however, the reduction can keep operators cognitively engaged and 
actively a part of the decision-making process, which promotes critical function 
performance as well as situation awareness (Endsley, 1997).  Higher workloads can be 
seen as a less-than-optimal and inefficient design approach, but efficiency should not 
necessarily be the primary consideration when designing a DSS.  Keen and Scott-Morton 
(1978) assert that using a computer aid to improve the effectiveness of decision making is 
more important than improving the efficiency.  Automation can indeed make a system 
highly efficient but ineffective, especially if knowledge needed for a correct decision is 
not available in a predetermined algorithm.  Thus higher, more “efficient” levels of 
automation are not always the best selection for an effective DSS. 
While it is well established that the use of automation in human computer 
interfaces should be investigated fully from a design standpoint, there are also ethical 
considerations, especially for interfaces that impact human life such as weapon and 
medical interfaces.  What might seem to be the most effective level of automation from a 
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design viewpoint may not be the most ethical.  The focus on the impact of automation on 
the user’s actions is a critical design consideration; however, another important point is 
how automation can impact a user’s sense of responsibility and accountability.  In one of 
the few references in the technical literature on humans and automation that considers the 
relationship between automation and moral responsibility, Sheridan (1996) is wary of 
individuals “blissfully trusting the technology and abandoning responsibility for one’s 
own actions.”   
 Overly trusting automation in complex system operation is a well-recognized 
decision support problem.  Known as automation bias, humans have a tendency to 
disregard or not search for contradictory information in light of a computer-generated 
solution that is accepted as correct (Mosier & Skitka, 1996; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).  
Automation bias is particularly problematic when intelligent decision support is needed 
in large problem spaces with time pressure like what is needed in command and control 
domains such as emergency path planning and resource allocation (Cummings, 2004). 
Moreover, automated decision aids designed to reduce human error can actually cause 
new errors in the operation of a system.  In an experiment in which subjects were 
required to both monitor low fidelity gauges and participate in a tracking task, 39 out of 
40 subjects committed errors of commission, i.e. these subjects almost always followed 
incorrect automated directives or recommendations, despite the fact that contraindications 
existed and verification was possible (Skitka et al., 1999).  Automation bias is an 
important consideration from a design perspective, but as will be demonstrated in the 
next section, it is also one that has ethical implications as well. 
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2.1 Automation and Accountability 
 
While automation bias can be addressed through training intervention techniques 
(Ahlstrom et al., 2003, however see Skitka, et al., 1999 for conflicting evidence), the 
degradation of accountability and abandonment of responsibility when using automated 
computer interfaces are much more difficult and ambiguous questions to address. 
Automated decision support tools are designed to improve decision effectiveness and 
reduce human error, but they can cause operators to relinquish a sense of responsibility 
and subsequently accountability because of a perception that the automation is in charge.  
Sheridan (1983) maintains that even in the information-processing role, “individuals 
using the system may feel that the machine is in complete control, disclaiming personal 
accountability for any error or performance degradation.” 
Some research on social accountability suggests that increasing social 
accountability reduces primacy effect (the tendency to best remember the salient cues that 
are seen first) (Tetlock, 1983), which is akin to automation bias.  Social accountability is 
defined as people having to explain and justify their social judgments about others.  In 
theory, increased accountability motivates subjects to employ more self-critical and 
cognitively complex decision making strategies (Tetlock & Boettger, 1989).  However, 
previous studies on social accountability focused on human judgments about other 
humans and did not incorporate technology, specifically automation, so they are 
somewhat limited in the application of social accountability to the discussion of 
computers and accountability. 
Skitka, Mosier, and Burdick (2000) attempted to bridge the gap in researching 
accountability from a purely social perspective to one that included technology in the 
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form of automation.  The specific intent of this study was to determine the effects of 
social accountability on automation bias.  Instead of being held accountable for their 
judgments about other people, subjects were required to justify strategies and outcomes 
in computerized flight simulation trials.  The results showed that not only did increased 
social accountability lead to fewer instances of automation bias through decreased errors 
of omission and commission, but also improved overall task performance (Skitka, 
Mosier, & Burdick, 2000).   
If increased accountability can reduce the effects of automation bias, how then 
could decision support systems be designed to promote accountability?  For complex 
socio-technical systems, accountability will most likely come from an established 
organizational structure and policies put in place by higher-level management.  However, 
one tangible design consideration for accountability would be the number of people 
required to interact with a given decision support system.  Research indicates that 
responsibility for tasks is diffused when people work in collective groups as opposed to 
working alone, and this concept is known as “social loafing” (see Karau & Williams, 
1993 for a review).  By designing systems that require the fewest individuals in a 
decision-making component, it is possible that erosion in accountability through social 
loafing could be diminished.  However, while research indicates that people experience 
degraded task responsibility through collective action, the potential loss of a sense of 
moral responsibility and agency for operators interacting collectively through human-
computer interfaces is not as clearly understood.  It is likely that the computer interface 
becomes another entity in the collective group so that responsibility, and hence 
accountability, can be cognitively offloaded not only to the group, but also to the 
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computer.  This is one area in human-computer interaction and accountability research 
that deserves significantly more attention.  
3. DESIGNING A MORAL BUFFER 
 
 Because of the diminishment of accountability that can result from interactions 
with computers and automation, I argue that when developing a human computer 
interface for any system that has the ability to harm people, such as interfaces for 
weapons and medical interfaces, the possibility exists that a moral buffer, a form of 
distancing and compartmentalization, is created which allows people to morally and 
ethically distance themselves from their actions. The concept of moral buffering is related 
to but not the same as Bandura’s (2002) idea of moral disengagement, in which people 
disengage in moral self-censure in order to engage in reprehensible conduct.  A moral 
buffer adds an additional layer of ambiguity and possible diminishment of accountability 
and responsibility through an artifact or process, such as a computer interface or 
automated recommendations.  Moral buffers can be the conduits for moral 
disengagement, which is precisely the reason for the need to examine ethical issues in 
interface design. 
 A key element in the development of a moral buffer is the sense of distance and 
remoteness that computer interfaces create for their users.  This sense of distance created 
by computer interfaces can best be illustrated through a military weapons interface 
example; although, as will be demonstrated, moral buffers can occur in other domains.  
The military is currently developing smart weapons such as cruise missiles and 
unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV’s), which once launched, can be redirected in-
flight to a target of opportunity in a matter of minutes.  While these weapons will provide 
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the military with unprecedented rapid battlefield response, developing technologies of 
this sort also have the potential to become moral buffers that allow humans to kill without 
adequately considering the consequences.   In general, these types of weapons can be 
fired from remote distances; for example, the military recently used missiles in Iraq that 
can be fired from over 1000 miles from their intended target with pinpoint accuracy.  
While this distance is effective in protecting our own forces, it is also likely that 
increasing the distance from the battlefield diminishes a sense of accountability.  
 The desire to kill the enemy from afar, termed “distant punishment,” is deeply 
rooted in the military culture, and even using the term “distant punishment” is a 
euphemistic form of moral buffering.  Military historian and psychologist Dave 
Grossman contends that military personnel have a deep-seated desire to avoid personal 
confrontation, and thus use distant punishment as a way to exert military will without 
having to face the consequences of combat (Grossman, 1998).  Grossman depicts the 
level of resistance to firing a weapon as a function of proximity to the enemy in Figure 1.  
In addition, he reports that there have been virtually no instances of noncompliance in 
firing weapons from removed distances, while there are significant instances of refusal to 
fire for soldiers engaged in hand-to-hand combat (Grossman, 2000). 
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Figure 1:  Resistance to Killing as a Function of Distance (Grossman, 1995) 
  
 In addition to the actual physical distance that makes it easier for people to kill, 
Grossman (1995) contends that emotional distance is a significant contributor as well.  
Emotional distancing in many domains is necessary for job performance, such as police 
work, the medical community, and in the military in general.  However, there is a distinct 
difference in developing emotional distance for self or team preservation, and developing 
emotional distance through technology to make killing another human more palatable.  
Grossman contends that emotional distance in the context of killing can be obtained 
through social factors that cause one group to view a particular class of people as less 
than human, which include cultural elements such as racial and ethnic differences, as well 
as a sense of moral superiority. However, the primary emotional distancing element 
hypothesized by Grossman that should be of concern to interface designers is that of 
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mechanical distancing.  In this form of emotional distancing, some technological devices 
provide the remote distance that makes it easier to kill.  These devices can be TV and 
video screens, thermal sights, or some other mechanical apparatus that provides a 
psychological buffer, an element that Grossman terms “Nintendo® warfare (Grossman, 
1995).”  With the recent advancements in smart weapons that are controlled through 
computer interfaces that resemble popular video games, both the physical and emotional 
distancing that occur with remotely launching and controlling weapons provides an even 
greater sense of detachment than ever seen previously in modern warfare. 
 The famous Milgram studies of the early 1960’s help to illustrate how the concept 
of remoteness from the consequences of one’s actions can drastically alter human 
behavior. In these studies, the focal point of the research was to determine how 
“obedient” subjects would be to requests from someone they considered to be a 
legitimate authority.  Under the impression that the real purpose of the study was to 
examine learning and memory, subjects, as the “teachers,” were told to administer 
increasing levels of electric shocks to another person, the learner, who was actually a 
confederate participant, when this person made mistakes on a memory test.  While many 
different types of experimental conditions were examined, the one most pertinent to this 
discussion of moral buffers is the difference in subject behavior that was dependent on 
whether or not the teacher could see the learner.  When the learner was in sight, 70% of 
the subjects refused to administer the shocks, as opposed to only 35% who resisted when 
the subject was located in a remote place, completely out of contact with the teacher 
(Milgram, 1975). 
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 Milgram (1975) hypothesized that the increase in resistance to shocking another 
human when the human was in sight could be attributed to several factors.    One 
important factor could be attributed to the idea of empathetic cues.  When people are 
administering potentially painful stimuli to other humans in a remote location, they are 
only aware in a conceptual sense that suffering could result.  Milgram had this to say 
about the lack of empathetic cues in military weapons delivery, “The bombardier can 
reasonably suppose that his weapons will inflict suffering and death, yet this knowledge 
is divested of affect and does not arouse in him an emotional response to the suffering he 
causes (Milgram, 1975).”  Milgram proposed several other factors account for the 
distance/obedience effect to include narrowing of the cognitive field for subjects, which 
is essentially the “out of sight, out of mind” phenomenon.  All of these factors are clearly 
present in the use of a weapons delivery computer interface, especially for one that 
controls weapons from over 1000 miles away. 
 In addition to physical and emotional distance and the sense of remoteness, and 
detachment from negative consequences that interfaces can provide, it is also possible 
that without consciously recognizing it, people assign moral agency to the computer, 
despite the fact that it is an inanimate object, which adds to the moral buffering effect. 
The human tendency to anthropomorphize computers has been well-established (Reeves 
& Nass, 1996). Furthermore, it has been established that automated decision support 
systems with ‘low observability’ can cause humans to view the automated system as an 
independent agent capable of willful action (Sarter & Woods, 1994).  Low observability 
occurs in a complex system with high levels of automation authority (automation acts 
without human intervention) but little feedback for the human operator (Sarter & Woods, 
 15
1994). Viewing automation as an independent agent is also known as ‘perceived 
animacy’ and examples of this can be found in commercial airline cockpits where pilots 
will ask questions about flight management automation such as “What is it doing?” and 
“Why did it do that (Sarter & Woods, 1994)?” 
 In a research study designed to determine subject views about computer agency 
and moral responsibility, twenty-nine male computer science undergraduate students 
were interviewed concerning their views of computer agency and moral responsibility in 
delegation of decision making to the computer.  Results suggested that these educated 
individuals with significant computer experience do hold computers at least partially 
responsible for computer error (Friedman & Millet, 1997).  It follows then that if 
computer systems can diminish users’ senses of their own moral agency and 
responsibility, this would lead to erosion of accountability (Friedman & Kahn, 1997).   In 
automated supervisory systems, human users can be isolated in a compartmentalized 
subsystem and detached from the overall system mission.  This disengagement can cause 
them to have little understanding of the larger purpose or meaning of their individual 
actions.  Because of this diminished sense of agency, when errors occur, computers can 
be seen as the culprits. When this diminished sense of agency occurs, “individuals may 
consider themselves to be largely unaccountable for the consequences of their computer 
use (Friedman & Kahn, 1997).” 
 An example of how a computer decision support tool can become a moral buffer 
between the human and computer is that of the Acute Physiology and Chronic Health 
Evaluation (APACHE) system.  The APACHE system is a quantitative tool used in 
hospitals to determine the stage of an illness where treatment would be futile.  While it 
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could be seen as decision support tool to provide a recommendation as to when a person 
should be removed from life support systems, it is generally viewed as a highly predictive 
prognostic system for groups, not individuals (Helft, Siegler, & Lantos, 2000).  The 
APACHE system could provide a moral buffer through allowing medical personnel to 
distance themselves from a very difficult decision (“I didn’t make the decision to turn off 
the life support systems, the computer did”).  By allowing the APACHE system the 
authority to make a life and death decision, the moral burden could be seen as shifting 
from the human to the computer. 
 The designers of this system recommend that APACHE only be used as a 
consultation tool to aid in the decision of removing life support and should not be a 
“closed loop” system (Friedman & Kahn, 1997).  The ethical difficulty arises when 
technologies like APACHE become entrenched in the culture.  Since the system has 
consistently made accurate recommendations, the propensity for automation bias and 
over-reliance could allow medical personnel, who are already overwhelmed in the 
workplace, to increasingly rely upon this technology to make tough decisions.  When 
systems like the APACHE system are deemed to be a legitimate authority for these types 
of decisions, the system could in effect become a closed-loop system, which was not 
originally intended.  Instead of guidance, the automated recommendations could become 
a heuristic, a rule-of-thumb, which becomes the default condition, and hence a moral 
buffer.   
 The same psychological phenomenon that creates possible moral buffers in the 
use of computer interfaces for medical advice may apply to decision support systems for 
weapons delivery, and indeed, for any computerized system that can inflict harm upon 
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people.  Acting through a seemingly innocuous apparatus like a computer interface and 
making potentially fatal decisions such as directing weapons through the click of a mouse 
can create a moral buffer and allow people to perceive themselves as not responsible for 
whatever consequences result.   It could be argued that those people who actually control 
in-flight weapons are only following orders of superiors, and thus the actual operators are 
not responsible for their actions.  In older military systems, a commander would make a 
weapons firing decision and then, for example, order an underling to push the button that 
actually launched a weapon.  Unfortunately, command and control technology have 
outpaced both human reasoning capabilities and traditional command structures.  In smart 
weapons control of the future, weapons will no longer be controlled by junior enlisted 
personnel with little training.  Smart weapons control in the future will require complex 
problem solving and critical analysis in real-time, which will be accomplished by 
educated, highly trained personnel who have the ability to both approve and disapprove 
Figure 2:  A Military Planning Tool 
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of a weapons launch (such as pilots who have the authority to not drop a bomb if the 
situation warrants.)  It is precisely this group of decision makers who will be most 
affected by a moral buffer. 
 An example of how a particular design element could contribute to a moral buffer 
in the use of computer interfaces can be seen in Figure 2.  This is a screenshot of an 
actual military missile planning computer program based on Microsoft’s Excel® software 
package, which aids a military planner in planning an “optimal” mission (LoPresto, 
2002).  The user of this interface is likely to be a mid-career officer who is well educated 
and has the authority to choose between both resources and targets.  The task of mission 
planning carries with it great responsibility, as millions of dollars in weapons, 
immeasurable hours in manpower, and scheduling of ships, planes, and troops are at the 
disposal of the planner.  With users (the planners) bearing such serious responsibility, it is 
curious that the interface designers chose to represent the help feature using a happy, 
cute, and non-aggressive dog.  A help feature is no doubt a useful tool for successful 
mission accomplishment, but adding such a cheerful, almost funny graphic could aid in 
the creation of a moral buffer by providing a greater sense of detachment in planning 
certain death through such an innocuous medium.  It could be argued that in fact, this 
kind of interface is desirable as not to add to the already high stress of the mission 
planner; however, making the task seem more “fun” and less distasteful is not the way to 
reduce user stress.   
 A weapons control interface, even with the most elegant and thoughtful user 
design, may become a moral buffer, allowing users, who will be decision makers with 
authority and not subordinates “just following orders”, to distance themselves from the 
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lethality of their decisions. Interface designers should be cognizant of the buffering effect 
when designing interfaces that require a very quick human decision, and be careful when 
adding elements such as the happy dog in Figure 2 that make a computer interface more 
like a leisure video game than an interface that will be responsible for lost lives.  If 
computers are seen as the moral agents (i.e. I was only following the recommendations of 
the automation), military commanders may be tempted to use remotely operated weapons 
in real-time retargeting scenarios without the careful deliberation that occurred with older 
versions of weapons that required months of advance planning, and that once launched, 
cannot be redirected. Likewise, the same elements apply for users of any interface that 
impact human life such as medical devices and emergency response resources. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 Because of the inherent complexity of socio-technical systems, decision support 
systems that integrate higher levels of automation can possibly allows users to perceive 
the computer as a legitimate authority, diminish moral agency, and shift accountability to 
the computer, thus creating a moral buffering effect.  This effect can be particularly 
exacerbated by large organizations and the physical distancing that occurs with remote 
operation of devices such as weapons.  For interface designs that require significant 
human cognitive contribution, especially in decision support arenas that directly impact 
human life such as weapons and medical systems, it is paramount that designers 
understand their unique role and responsibilities in the design process.  The need for 
careful reflection on ethical issues should be a concern for the development of decision 
support systems for weapons; however, all domains in which computers have the 
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potential to impact human life deserve the same level of ethical and social impact 
analysis.   
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